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Abstract
We look at the optimal inter-temporal management of the fuel reservoir of nuclear units in a
liberalized electricity market. We use the assumption that nuclear fuel works as a ”reservoir” of
energy due to the periodical shutdown of nuclear units to reload their fuel. In the medium-term,
how a producer sets the nuclear fuel of the reservoir to respond to the variations of seasonal
demand in order to maximize its production value on a multi-annual basis? The dynamic
nature of the nuclear fuel reservoir highlighted the discontinuity of the price which complicates
the resolution of the optimal inter-temporal production problem and even leads to a lack of
solutions. Theoretically, at the optimum, nuclear is used to serve baseload and thermal follows
demand’s variations. Numerically, both nuclear and thermal units operate in load-following
mode. Solutions characterized by a constant nuclear production do not exist which shows that
the significant share of nuclear in the energy mix does not permit to produce at a constant rate
unless further investments in thermal capacity are done. Inter-temporal optimization shows
the role of nuclear for ensuring the equilibrium between supply and demand.
Key words: Electricity production, nuclear fuel reservoir, inter-temporal optimization,
thermal production, merit order price, discontinuity problem.
JEL code numbers: C61, C63, D24, D41, L11.
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21 Introduction
The novelty of our research consists of the characteristic of the “reservoir” of nuclear fuel which
results from the discontinuous reloading of nuclear reactors. Every 12 or 18 months, nuclear
reactors reload their fuel and then a period of production named “campaign” begins. In the
medium-term, a producer sets its production during a campaign of nuclear fuel reservoir to
respond to the seasonal variations of demand and to maximize its profit. The important size
of the French2 nuclear set is the main reason why nuclear does not serve only as a baseload3
generation technology but it has to be flexible4 to participate significantly in the modulation
of supply between winter (season of high demand) and summer (season of low demand) and
therefore ensure the stability of the electricity grid (Pouret and Nuttall (2007), Bruynooghe et
al. (2010)). This can be seen in the monitoring report of the Regulatory Commission of Energy
which provides us with an illustration of the management of the French nuclear set (Regulatory
Commission of Energy (2007)). In a market based electricity industry, the objective should be
the maximization of the value of electricity production. Consequently, the question of the
optimal management of the nuclear fuel reservoir during a campaign of production arises.
A number of technico-economical constraints regarding the nuclear production need to be
considered which makes instantly our model complex. Firstly, we look at the constraints
imposed by the flexible management of nuclear units (minimum/maximum production con-
straints). Generally, a nuclear unit can vary its capacity level between the nominal capacity
and the technical minimum. In the case of an EPR, load follow enables planned variations in
energy demand to be followed and can be activated between 25% of nominal capacity (technical
minimum) and 100% of nominal capacity (technical maximum) (NEA/AEN (2011)). Secondly,
nuclear fuel constraints result from the inter-temporal management of the nuclear fuel stock
during the production period given the periodical interruptions of nuclear production to reload
reactors with fuel. Thirdly, we have to take into account the constraints imposed by the gener-
ation capacity of nuclear and thermal units (nuclear, coal, gas). Finally, the equality between
supply and demand every month is an essential constraint that all nuclear producers need to
take into consideration because the very large proportion of nuclear in the national energy mix
makes this constraint heavily dependent on nuclear generation.
The consideration of competition is another aspect that complicates our model since France
in contrast to other countries (e.g. UK) has not completely opened till now its electricity
market to competition. Actually, the French nuclear operator (EDF) is essentially public and
dominates the electricity market which shows that there is not sufficient place for competition
in the electricity market (Chevalier (2004)). Consequently, the optimization of the management
2Several countries with a significant share in nuclear generated electricity, Slovakia (51.8%) and Belgium
(51.1%), partly operate in load-following mode.
3Baseload plants are the production facilities used to meet some or all of a given region’s continuous energy
demand, and produce energy at a constant rate, usually at a low cost relative to other production facilities
available to the system.
4From a technical point of view, nuclear reactors of modern design (the third generation and its evolution
III+) are capable of a flexible operation (Nuttall and Pouret (2007), Guesdon et al. (1985)). In fact, this
flexibility is primarily due to the new types of fuels which affect the constraints that determine the speed of
increase and decrease of production. This type of constraint (called ramping rate constraints) binds the change
of operation level of a unit between two successive periods. In principle, all nuclear reactors might reasonably be
regarded as having some capacity to follow load. In practice, however, the ability to meet grid needs efficiently
and safely is restricted to a certain set of design types (for technical engineering, safety and licensing reasons).
The new reactor EPR, which is an evolution of the pressurized water reactor (PWR), is an example of a
III+ generation nuclear reactor which is designed to accommodate load-following operation (AREVA (2005),
Goldberg and Rosner (2012)).
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3of the nuclear fuel reservoir of flexible nuclear plants in a purely competitive electricity system
is an entirely new question in the public literature. Creating a benchmark in order to respond
to this question could give insights into the optimal production behaviour of nuclear producers
for policy and industry.
In the second chapter of the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014), we analyzed the optimal man-
agement of the nuclear fuel reservoir on a short-term (monthly) time horizon of operation in a
competitive setting. Following, this partially “myopic” (short-sighted) approach of optimiza-
tion of the nuclear production, we pass to the “non-myopic” case being the inter-temporal
optimal management of the nuclear fuel reservoir. The optimal short-term production problem
is an essential step in order to build a complex model based on the operation of flexible nuclear
units in a competitive market dominated by the nuclear generation and the characteristic of
the nuclear fuel reservoir, and then, to cope with a large number of mathematical, technical
and computational difficulties in order to find an optimal production trajectory. Its existence
permits to move to a more complex optimal production problem based on the inter-temporal
optimization of the nuclear production in an identical framework. In addition, the analysis of
the outcome of the optimal short-term production problem helped to discover the potential ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such approach before we proceed with a full optimization of the
nuclear fuel stock. Here, the nuclear managers aim to optimize the operation of the reservoir
on a time horizon which consists of several campaigns (typically 36 months).
In section 2, we start with the modelling of the optimal inter-temporal production problem
in a framework of perfect competition. This framework also keeps modelling and assumptions
identical to those made in the case of a short-term optimization of the operation of the nuclear
fuel reservoir examined in the second chapter of the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014). Then, we
introduce the modelling of the optimal inter-temporal production behaviour. It consists of
the maximization of the inter-temporal profit under the optimization constraints mentioned
above. In section 3, we study the optimization of the inter-temporal production. However,
we meet a mathematical-economical-technical difficulty which is that of the discontinuity of
the merit order price. We treat this difficulty and then, we provide a new property that fully
characterizes the optimal solutions of the optimal inter-temporal production problem in the
particular case that production constraints are not binding. In section 4, we propose a simple
numerical model which analyzes the optimal production decisions resulting from the optimal
inter-temporal production problem. In the same section, we study an economical feature of
producers’ optimal behaviour: the symmetry of an equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal
production problem. We apply Scilab5 to run our simulations by using some basic data. To
end, the numerical results of the optimal inter-temporal production problem are contrasted
with the numerical results of the optimal short-term production problem in order to compare
these two approaches. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model: Perfect competitive case
In this section, we present briefly our general deterministic multi-period model of perfect com-
petition6. Producers operate both with nuclear and thermal plants and there exists perfect
5Scilab is an open source, cross-platform numerical computational package and a high-level, numerically
oriented programming language. It can be used for numerical optimization, and modelling, simulation of
dynamical systems, statistical analysis etc.
6Let us remember that in presence of perfect competition firms are price-takers: they treat price as a
parameter and not as a choice variable. Price taking firms guarantee that when firms maximize their profits (by
choosing the quantity they wish to produce and the technology of generation to produce it with) the market
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4information among them. Our modelling aims to determine the inter-temporal optimal man-
agement of the nuclear fuel reservoir in that competitive framework. We focus on the medium-
term horizon in order to take into consideration the seasonal variations of demand during a
campaign of production. Our optimization constraints contain nuclear fuel storage constraints,
production constraints coming from the flexible operation of nuclear units and the genera-
tion capacity as well as constraints resulting from the equality between supply and demand.
These constraints are decisive for the determination of the optimal solutions in this wholesale
electricity market.
In our model, a number of assumptions have been made mainly in order to avoid complicate
our model and because it is not possible to have access to detailed data. In the second chapter
of the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014), we provide analytically the reasons which impose and/or
motivate our hypothesis and the way that they may influence our modelling supposing that we
did not effectuate them. In particular, importations and exportations as well as the produc-
tion resulting from hydro-storage units7 and renewables8 are not considered within our model.
Another point is that we calculate the profit without taking into account a discount rate or a
mark-up rate. Note that mathematical proofs and numerical data can be found in the third
chapter and the annexes of the Ph.D. thesis (Lykidi (2014)).
2.1 Modelling the generating units
We study a competitive electricity market with N > 2 producers who manage both nuclear
and thermal generating units. A producer n = 1, · · · , N can operate with all types of nuclear
generating units. Moreover, each producer disposes of a certain amount of thermal capacity.
2.1.1 Concept of type
Among the nuclear generating units, we distinguish several essential intrinsic characteristics:
• available nuclear capacity,
• minimum capacity when in use,
• month of their fuel reloading.
In our model, the minimum capacity is proportional to the available capacity, and this pro-
portion is the same for all “physical” nuclear reactors. Therefore, for each “physical” nuclear
reactor, we will focus on the month of fuel reloading, which permits us to define twelve “types”
of nuclear units. Each type indexed by j = 1, · · · , 12 corresponds to a different month of reload-
ing of the nuclear unit. Then, a unit which belongs to the type of unit j = 1 (respectively
j = 2, · · · , j = 12) shuts down in the month of January (respectively February, · · · , December).
price will be equal to marginal cost.
7There exists an extensive literature that studies the optimal management of hydro-reservoirs in mixed hydro-
thermal competitive markets and where one can see several modellings of the optimal production problem and
notice the increased level of difficulty from a theoretical and numerical point of view (Arellano (2004), Bushnell
(2003)).
8The electricity production coming from renewable energy plants is variable or intermittent because of the
stochastic nature of weather patterns which means that it should be a stochastic endogenous variable in our
model. Its consideration would impose a radically different modelling, a stochastic modelling, whose nature is
not consistent with the deterministic character of our model.
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5A nuclear plant9 may contain several “physical” nuclear reactors, which (for operational
reasons) do not reload on the same month. The characteristic “type” for the nuclear case
is not related to the plant but to the reactor. Each producer n = 1, · · · , N owns a precise
number of “physical” nuclear reactors that are grouped according to the month of reloading
(independently of the locations) in order to constitute units. Therefore, it can hold a certain
level of capacity from each type of nuclear unit.
The modelling regarding the thermal units is the same except that the minimum capacity is
equal to zero and that there is no month of reloading. There is a unique type of thermal units.
2.2 Modelling the production costs
We recollect the modelling of the production costs. The cost functions of both nuclear and
thermal production are common to all producers. The nuclear cost function is made of a fixed
part determined by the cost of investment, the fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable
part which corresponds to the variable cost of exploitation and fuel cost. We assume that the
cost function of the nuclear production is affine and defined as
Cnucn,j (q
nuc
njt ) = a
n,j
nuc + bnucq
nuc
njt .
The thermal cost function is also made of a fixed part which corresponds to the cost of
investment, the fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable part covering the variable
cost of exploitation, the fuel cost, the cost of CO2 as well as the taxes on the gas fuel. We
assume that the thermal production has a quadratic cost function Cthn (.) which is the following:
Cthn (q
th
nt) = a
n
th + bthq
th
nt + c
n
thq
th
nt
2
.
The nuclear and thermal cost functions are monotone increasing and convex functions of qnucnjt
and qthnt respectively. We choose a quadratic cost function and thus, an increasing marginal cost
for the thermal production because: (i) the thermal production results from different fossil fuel
generation technologies (e.g. coal, gas -combined cycle or not-, fuel oil), (ii) the high fixed costs
of thermal production need to be recovered, (iii) we want to keep our model simple by choosing
the simplest cost function for thermal (DGEMP & DIDEME (2003, 2008), MIT (2003, 2009),
Cour des Comptes (2012)).
2.3 Notations and constraints
• T : the time horizon of our model. Its length is chosen to be equal to 36 months10 beginning
by the month of January in order to obtain a sufficiently long time horizon to follow up
the evolution of the value of the optimal solutions and at the same time to be consistent
with the absence of the discount rate. The complexity of our model leads to compromise
refinement of the model and computational capacity by choosing a reasoning in months11
rather than weeks.
• Tcampaign: the time horizon of the campaign. A French nuclear producer has two main options
regarding the scheduling of fuel reloading (Source: EDF (2008), CEA (2008)):
9A nuclear power plant is a thermal power station in which the heat source arises from nuclear reactions.
A nuclear unit is the set that consists of two parts: the reactor which produces heat to boil water and make
steam and the electricity generation system in which one associates: the turbine and the generator. The steam
drives the turbine which turns the shaft of the generator to produce electricity (Source: SFEN).
10The time horizon of the model is a multiplicative of twelve, being expressed in months. Therefore it could
be modified.
11This reasoning is also met in articles which study the optimal management of hydro-reservoirs in mixed
hydro-thermal electricity systems (e.g. Arellano (2004), Bushnell (1998)).
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6• per third (1/3) of fuel reservoir (representing a reloading of reactor’s core per third of
its full capacity) that corresponds to 18 months of campaign and 396 days equivalent
to full capacity for a unit of 1300 MW,
• per quarter (1/4) of fuel reservoir (representing a reloading of reactor’s core per
quarter of its full capacity) that corresponds to 12 months of campaign and 258
days equivalent to full capacity for a unit of 1500 MW.
Both options12 of fuel reloading result from the operational schema of EDF (Electricite´ de
France) that is strategically chosen in order to optimize the allocation of the shutdowns of
nuclear reactors for reloading (EDF (2008, 2010)). So, the scheduling of fuel reloading is
entirely exogenous within our model (Bertel and Naudet (2004), CEA (2008)). Our goal
is to determine the optimal allocation of the nuclear fuel stored in the reservoir during the
different campaigns of production for a reloading pattern provided by the French nuclear
operator via the model ORION. We retain a duration of campaign equivalent to 12 months
to get a cyclic model with a periodicity of one year. The one year period can be then
decomposed into 11 months being the period of production and 1 month corresponding to
the month of reloading of the fuel. We do not choose a campaign of 18 months because it
is not in accordance with the “good” seasonal allocation of shutdowns of the nuclear units
which consists of avoiding shutdowns in high demand periods (winter) and concentrating
them as much as possible in low demand periods (between May and September). In fact,
if the nuclear producer reloads fuel in summer when the demand is low the date of the
next reloading will be then in winter when the demand is high. The case of having both a
campaign of 12 and of 18 months is excluded in order to avoid complicate our model and
because the choice of normative duration of the campaign can not be changed for a given
nuclear reactor. The Nuclear Safety Authority (NSA)13 has to give the authorization for
any changes on the choice of duration of the campaign. Additional to that the optimal
allocation of the shutdowns of all 58 nuclear reactors for reloading is decided in advance
according to safety rules imposed by NSA.
• Dt: the level of demand observed in month t = 1, · · · , T . The demand for electricity being
an exogenous variable is assumed perfectly inelastic mainly because in the short-term to
medium-term, we may consider that price variations can not be observed by consumers in
real time and consumers habits and prior investments in electrical devices can not change
immediately. If we include a price elasticity of demand in our model, it would have a
random value since there are no particular elements that enable to assess its value.
• Qhydt : the hydro-production coming from the run-of-river
14 hydro plants in month t =
1, · · · , T . We assume that the monthly run-of-river hydro production is constant over
the total time horizon of our model given: (i) the non-availability of the data with regard
to the seasonal variations of hydro production because of precipitation and snow melt-
ing, (ii) its low volatility caused by a relatively low standard deviation which leads to a
steady evolution of its monthly value near to the mean over a year. It is calculated by the
mean of the yearly production. In this way, we deduce a significant part of the base load
demand in order to have a more accurate picture of the demand served by the nuclear
12In the case of a unit of 900 MW, the scheduling of fuel reloading is the following: (i) 1/3 of fuel reservoir
that corresponds to 18 months of campaign and 385 days equivalent to full capacity, (ii) 1/4 of fuel reservoir
that corresponds to 12 months of campaign and 280 days equivalent to full capacity.
13The Nuclear Safety Authority (NSA) is tasked, on behalf of the state, with regulating nuclear safety in
order to protect workers, the public and the environment in France.
14The run-of-river hydro plants have little or no capacity for energy storage, hence they can not co-ordinate
the output of electricity generation to match consumer demand. Consequently, they serve as baseload power
plants.
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7and thermal units. The intermittency that determines the base load production of the
renewable energy plants makes our model more complex and additionally to this it is not
coherent with the deterministic character of our model which is why we do not consider
it.
• qnucnjt : the level of the nuclear production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the unit j of
producer n.
• Qn,j,nucmax : the maximum nuclear production that can be realized by the unit j of producer n
during a month. The nuclear capacity is an exogenous variable.
• Qn,j,nucmin : the minimum nuclear production that can be realized by the unit j of producer n
during a month.
• qthnt: the level of the thermal production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the producer n.
• Qn,thmax: the maximum thermal production during a month for the producer n. It corresponds to
the nominal thermal capacity of producer n. A producer may use the thermal resources
to produce electricity until it reaches the level of demand of the corresponding month
respecting at the same time the constraint (5). The thermal capacity is an exogenous
variable.
• Qn,thmin: the minimum thermal production during a month for the producer n. There is no
minimum for thermal production Qn,thmin = 0.
The minimum and maximum production constraints have the form:{
Qn,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
njt 6 Q
n,j,nuc
max , if no reload during month t for unit j
qnucnjt = 0, if unit j reloads during month t
(1)
0 6 qthnt 6 Q
n,th
max (2)
• Sn,jreload: the nuclear fuel stock of reloading available to the unit j of producer n. This stock will
be expressed thanks to the conversion between the quantity of energy and the correspond-
ing number of days of operation at full capacity rather than expressing it in kilograms of
uranium or number of nuclear fuel rods. In our model, the number of days of operation
equivalent to full capacity is constant for all j, n and inferior than 11 months which per-
mits and obliges at the same time to modulate the nuclear production. The nuclear fuel
stock of reloading Sn,jreload is equal to the corresponding capacity of the units of type j of
producer n (Capacityn,j,nuc) multiplied by the number of hours equivalent to full capacity
during a campaign. More precisely, one has:
Sn,jreload = 1× Capacity
n,j,nuc × Number of days equivalent to full capacity×24
which corresponds to the nuclear fuel stock of reloading over a campaign of production.
• Sn,jt : the quantity of fuel stored in the nuclear reservoir and available to the unit j of producer
n at the beginning of the month t = 1, · · · , T . Evidently, we have Sn,jt > 0. If t is the
month during which the producer n reloads the fuel of the reactor then, the stock at
the beginning of the following month (beginning of the campaign) is equal to Sn,jreload.
A producer has a quantity of nuclear fuel stock equal to zero at the end of a campaign
(beginning of the month of reloading) which means that it spends all its nuclear fuel stock
of reloading Sn,jreload during the campaign. The reasons that lead us to this ascertainment
mainly concern the implicit costs that result from not consuming the totality of the
nuclear fuel stock during a campaign. Moreover, a producer has to finish the period T
at least with the same quantity of nuclear fuel as the initial one (Sn,jT+1 > S
n,j
1 ). The
consideration of this constraint is motivated by some arguments analytically exposed in
the second chapter (avoid to “over-consume” the nuclear fuel stock to reach the maximum
nuclear production level because of induced negative effects, assure that each new cycle
of simulations of 36 months starts with the same quantity of nuclear fuel (Sn,j1 )).
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8The nuclear fuel constraints for the nuclear unit j of producer n are defined as
follows:
j=1 j ∈ {2, · · · , 11} j=12∑12
t=2 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j−1
t=1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
1
∑11
t=1 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑24
t=14 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j+12−1
t=j+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload
∑23
t=13 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑T
t=26 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload
∑j+2·12−1
t=j+12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload
∑T−1
t=25 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload∑T
t=j+2·12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload − S
n,j
1
Table 1
We can see that the nuclear units of type {2, · · · , 11} have two additional constraints than
the nuclear units of type 1 and 12. This is because there exist, at the beginning and end of the
game, campaigns that we will qualify as incomplete.
2.4 Number of optimization variables and of optimization constraints
The entire number of optimization variables is equal to N ·(J ·T+T ) = N ·(12·36+36) = N ·468
within our model. The number of constraints resulting from the equality between supply and
demand is T = 36. Moreover, the number of nuclear fuel constraints is N · ((2 ·K + 1) · (J −
2)+ (2 ·K) · 2) = N · ((2 · 3+ 1) · (12− 2)+ (2 · 3) · 2) = N · 82, where K represents the number
of campaigns within our model. Finally, the number of minimum and maximum nuclear and
thermal production constraints is equal to N · (J · T + T ) = N · (12 · 36 + 36) = N · 468.
Consequently, the total number of optimization constraints is equal to N · 550 + 36. Even
in the case of a unique producer (N = 1), the number of variables (468) and of optimization
constraints (586) is quite large which results in computational difficulties. This is due to the fact
that the level of difficulty of the numerical program to compute a solution of an optimization
problem is increasing with respect to the size of the model (number of optimization variables,
number of optimization constraints).
2.5 The modelling of the optimal inter-temporal production be-
haviour
The optimal inter-temporal production problem that producer n resolves is the following:
max
((qnucnjt )
J
j=1,(q
th
nt))
T
t=1
T∑
t=1
(pt · (
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt)−
J∑
j=1
Cnucnj (q
nuc
njt )− C
th
n (q
th
nt)) (3)
subject to the nuclear fuel storage constraints provided in table 1 and the minimum/maximum
production constraints (4) and (5){
Qn,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
njt 6 Q
n,j,nuc
max , if no reload during month t for unit j
qnucnjt = 0, if unit j reloads during month t
(4)
(5)
The price pt is given by the marginal cost of the last technology of the merit order used to
equilibrate supply and demand (perfect competition). It is calculated independently of n and
is discontinuous on production vectors whose thermal component qthnt is equal to zero.
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92.6 The notion of equilibrium
Let us now give a definition of equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal production problem
with respect to a system of prices p ∈ RT+
Definition 2.1 The production vector (qn)
N
n=1 = (((q
nuc
1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t)
T
t=1, · · · , ((q
nuc
Njt)
J
j=1, q
th
Nt)
T
t=1)
is an equilibrium with respect to a system of prices p ∈ RT+ if:
(i) for all n, qn is a feasible production vector: (a) it respects the nuclear fuel constraints,
for all j and (b) it respects the minimum/maximum production constraints, for all j, t.
(ii) for all n, it maximizes the inter-temporal profit of producer n on the set of feasible
solutions.
(iii) the price, at each month t, is determined by the marginal cost of the marginal technology.
It is called the merit order price associated with the production vector (qn)
N
n=1.
(iv) at each date t, it respects the equality between supply and demand
N∑
n=1
(
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt) = Dt −Q
hyd
t . (6)
3 Optimization of the inter-temporal production
In this section, we show that under some assumptions, the inter-temporal profit decreases at
production vectors characterized by thermal components equal to zero as a result of the di-
scontinuity (decrease) of price at these production vectors. Then, we proceed by giving a
property that characterizes the “interior” optimal solutions of problem (3) (see page 8).
3.1 The decrease of inter-temporal profit in the absence of thermal
production
We define the set of feasible solutions of the optimal production problem (3) as
C =
{
q ∈M s.t.
Qn,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
njt 6 Q
n,j,nuc
max , for all n, j, t
0 6 qthnt 6 Q
n,th
max, for all n, t
}
where M is defined by all the production vectors of the form q = ((qnucnj1 )
J
j=1, · · · , (q
nuc
njT )
J
j=1,
qthn1, · · · , q
th
nT )
N
n=1 that respect the nuclear fuel constraints for all n as well as the supply-demand
equilibrium constraint for all t. The set M is affine and the set C is compact (closed and
bounded) and convex.
Moreover, we define F as the relative interior15 of C (F = ri(C)). It has the following form
F =
{
q ∈M s.t.
Qn,j,nucmin < q
nuc
njt < Q
n,j,nuc
max , for all n, j, t
0 < qthnt < Q
n,th
max, for all n, t
}
Notice that if unit j reloads during month t then qnucnjt = 0 and thus, the strict inequality
constraints that determine the nuclear production qnucnjt in the set F are no more valid.
15It is important to emphasize that the usual interior of C is empty since M is an affine set that is not equal
to Rn. Consequently, we focus on a classical generalization called relative interior (for the notion of the relative
interior of a set cf. for example Florenzano and Le Van (2001), Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), Pugh (2002)).
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Let us focus on the set F th defined as
F th =
{
q ∈M s.t.
Qn,j,nucmin 6 q
nuc
njt 6 Q
n,j,nuc
max , for all n, j, t
0 < qthnt 6 Q
n,th
max, for all n, t
}
Remark 3.1 F th contains F and is contained in C and C is contained in M (F ⊂ F th ⊂ C ⊂
M).
We now proceed with Proposition 3.1 which we will use to prove the decrease of the inter-
temporal profit at production vectors with zero levels of thermal production.
Proposition 3.1 If F th is a non-empty set, then the closure of F th is C (F th = C).
Proof
A proof of this proposition is given in the Ph.D. thesis on page 163 (Lykidi (2014)).

From a geometrical point of view one deduces from Proposition 3.1 that all the points of the
set C and consequently those which belong to C \ F th and hence contain thermal components
equal to zero can be approached by points that belong to F th. This result is fundamental
in order to show in the next proposition the discontinuity and more specifically the decrease
of the inter-temporal profit at these particular points which results from a decrease of price
(discontinuous problems have been analyzed in an economic framework (cf. for example Bich
and Laraki (2011)).
Proposition 3.2 For all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, if F th is a non-empty set, bnuc < bth and q ∈ C \F
th,
there exists a sequence (qr)r∈N ∈ F
th with limr→∞ qr = q such that limr→∞ pi
n(qr) > pi
n(q).
Proof
A proof of this proposition is provided in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 163−165 (Lykidi (2014)).

In view of our data, bnuc < bth holds, thus according to Proposition 3.2, the inter-temporal
profit decreases for all production vectors that belong to the subset C \ F th of C and hence
they are characterized by zero levels of thermal production. This leads all producers to search
for a solution that maximizes the inter-temporal profit on the set F th in which the thermal
production is strictly positive and the price is provided by the thermal marginal cost.
The following corollary shows the relation between the optimal inter-temporal production
problem on C and the optimal inter-temporal production problem on F th.
Corollary 3.1 The inter-temporal profit maximization problem determined on C is equivalent
to the inter-temporal profit maximization problem determined on F th (same set of solutions and
same value16).
Proof
This corollary is an obvious consequence of Proposition 3.2.

It should be noticed that the value of both optimization problems exists (in the real line)
because the objective function (profit function) is polynomial and the set C together with the
16The value of an optimization problem is defined as the upper bound of the set {f(x)|x ∈ C}, where f is
the objective function and C is the set of feasible solutions. The value always exists even if the set of solutions
is empty. When the set of solutions is non-empty, the value of an optimization problem is the common value
f(x) for any solution x.
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set F th are bounded. We also remark that if the inter-temporal profit maximization problem
is determined on C which is a compact set, the objective function is not continuous in view of
Proposition 3.2. If the inter-temporal profit maximization problem is determined on F th, the
objective function is continuous according to Proposition 3.2 while F th is not a compact set.
Therefore, we can not conclude on the existence of solutions of this problem (cf. for example
Varian (1992)). If a solution of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem on F th exists,
then it is an equilibrium since all the conditions in order to be an equilibrium are satisfied (see
Corollary 3.1 and Definition 2.1 on page 9).
3.2 Case of an “interior” optimal solution.
In view of Proposition 3.2 on page 10, we search for a solution that maximizes the inter-temporal
profit within the set F th. The next proposition gives a property when in addition the solution
of the optimal inter-temporal production problem belongs to the set F .
Proposition 3.3 For all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, if an equilibrium (((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt)
T
t=1)
N
n=1 ∈ F exists
such that the inter-temporal profit of the producer n is maximum on C and ((qnucnt )
T
t=1)
N
n=1 is the
corresponding monthly nuclear production vector then qnucn1 = q
nuc
n2 = · · · = q
nuc
nT .
Proof
A proof of this proposition is provided in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 167−170 (Lykidi (2014)).

Since F is not a compact set, the inter-temporal profit maximization problem may not have
a solution on F . Consequently, the existence of a solution of the problem (3) on F takes
the form of an assumption in Proposition 3.3. Moreover, Proposition 3.3 implies that each
producer holds a strictly positive level of nuclear capacity from all types of nuclear units (i.e.
Capacityn,j,nuc > 0 for all n, j).
3.2.1 Economic interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers of the optimal inter-
temporal production problem
Following the proof of Proposition 3.3, we can interpret economically the Lagrange multipliers
of the optimal inter-temporal production problem (3) presented within this proof. We recall
that µnt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the supply-demand equilibrium constraint
at each month t for the producer n and λn,kj is the Lagrange multiplier for the nuclear fuel
constraint of the unit j during the campaign k for the producer n. In view of the equality
between supply and demand and since q ∈ F , we deduce from equation (3.7) (respectively
(3.8)) appeared on page 169 of the proof that the sign of the multiplier µn1 (respectively µ
n
2 ) is
strictly positive for all n. By symmetry, the Lagrange multiplier µnt is strictly positive (µ
n
t > 0)
for all n, t. Consequently, in view of equations (3.9) and (3.10) on page 170 of the proof, the
multiplier λn,13 (respectively λ
n,k
j ) has a strictly negative sign for all n. Indeed, if an additional
unit of nuclear fuel became available for the unit j of producer n during the campaign k,
the thermal production of producer n and consequently the total thermal production obtained
during this campaign would decrease which would lead to a lower market price and thus to a
lower revenue for the producer n. At the same time the nuclear production cost of producer n
would increase while its thermal production cost would decrease. However, the first effect that
concerns the decrease of the revenue is the most important. Consequently, the “additional”
profit resulting from an additional nuclear fuel unit and thus the value of the multiplier λn,kj
should be negative. The multiplier λn,kj indicates the “marginal value of nuclear fuel stock”, i.e.
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the additional profit |λn,kj | unit j of producer n would get if the nuclear fuel stock decreased by
one unit during the campaign k.
We now proceed by showing that a constant monthly nuclear production constitutes a suf-
ficient condition for optimality on C. Let us state the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4 For all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, if (((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt)
T
t=1)
N
n=1 is a production vector be-
longing to F th such that qnucn1 = q
nuc
n2 = · · · = q
nuc
nT , where (q
nuc
nt )
T
t=1 is the corresponding monthly
nuclear production vector of producer n then (((qnucnjt )
J
j=1, q
th
nt)
T
t=1)
N
n=1 is a solution of the inter-
temporal profit maximization problem on C.
Proof
A proof of this proposition is provided in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 171−173 (Lykidi (2014)).

Remark 3.2 We can prove that the strict concavity of the profit function pin with regard to the
thermal production qthn implies the unicity of solutions with respect to the thermal component
for all n (Lykidi (2014)). However, if we consider the other variables which do not impact
the profit, the profit function pin is concave with regard to qn for all n, which does not entail
automatically the unicity of the entire solution.
3.2.2 Economic analysis of Proposition 3.3 and of Proposition 3.4
In view of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 (pages 11, 12), we conclude that in the absence of binding
productions constraints, the solutions of the optimal inter-temporal production problem are
fully characterized by a constant nuclear production. Consequently in such situations, from a
theoretical point of view, each producer maximizes its inter-temporal profit by using its nuclear
units in order to produce at a constant rate while it operates its thermal units to follow-up load
so that the global equilibrium between supply and demand is satisfied each month. Hence, at
the optimum, the nuclear production does not follow the seasonal variations of demand which
means that nuclear units operate only at baseload on a monthly basis. This implies that the
amplitude of demand has to be inferior than the thermal capacity Qthmax so that imbalances
between supply and demand are avoided every month. Note that the level of the nuclear
production of each producer being constant could never reach its maximum value given the
definition of the nuclear fuel stock of reloading Sn,jreload on page 7.
4 Numerical modelling
In this section, we proceed with an analysis of the nuclear and thermal production decisions
as well as the storage decisions obtained by the optimal inter-temporal production problem,
within a simple numerical model solved with Scilab.
4.1 Equivalence of equilibrium between an economy with N produc-
ers and an economy with one aggregate producer
From a mathematical point of view, the complexity of the optimal inter-temporal production
problem makes “necessary” to decrease the number of optimization variables and operational
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constraints. Indeed, even in the simplified case of one aggregate producer (for N = 1), we
obtain 586 operational constraints and 468 optimization variables given the time period of our
model (T = 36), the number of campaigns (K = 3) and the different types of nuclear units
(J = 12). We show in the next proposition that the equilibrium of the original economy with
N > 2 producers is “equivalent” to the equilibrium of an alternate economy with one aggregate
producer (N = 1). Thanks to this mathematical proposition, we simplify the resolution of our
optimization problem by determining an equilibrium of the economy with a unique producer
operating with the aggregate nuclear and thermal capacity instead of the economy with N
producers. This approach independent of the number of producers (reduction to a unique pro-
ducer) makes coherent the numerical modelling of the optimal short-term production problem
and the optimal inter-temporal production problem.
Proposition 4.1 Let us consider an economy E with several producers and let E˜ be the aux-
iliary economy with a unique producer obtained by the aggregation of the N producers of E.
(α) If (qn)
N
n=1 is an equilibrium of E, then its aggregation defined by q =
∑N
n=1 qn is an
equilibrium of E˜ with respect to the same prices.
(β) Conversely, if q is an equilibrium of E˜, it can then be decentralized as an equilibrium
(qn)
N
n=1 of E for the same prices.
Proof
A simple proof of this proposition is provided in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 177−182 (Lykidi
(2014)). Note that in part (β), there is no unicity in the process of decentralization.

4.1.1 Economic consequences of Proposition 4.1
According to Proposition 4.1 on page 13, we can say that the equilibrium q of the optimal
inter-temporal production problem of the auxiliary economy E˜ is equivalent to the equilib-
rium (qn)
N
n=1 of the optimal inter-temporal production problem of the decentralized economy
E. In view of this proposition, we consider from now on an economy with a unique producer
(N = 1) operating with the total nuclear and thermal capacity to meet the monthly demand.
For example, the exogenous variable Qthmax will now represent the aggregate maximum ther-
mal production. From an economical perspective, the equivalence of equilibria of the optimal
inter-temporal production problem between the economies E and E˜ implies that the optimal
production behavior in the case of the decentralization of the nuclear generation set is “neu-
tral” with respect to the optimal production behavior observed in the case of the centralized
management by an aggregate producer within our model. These results can be also found in
the case of the optimal short-term production problem.
4.2 Symmetry of equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal produc-
tion problem
In this section, we introduce the notion of symmetrisability within our model in order to
provide an economical property of producer’s optimal behaviour: under the assumption that
each producer disposes of the same level of nuclear and thermal capacity, we show that an
equilibrium of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem (3) is “almost” symmetric. More
precisely, we prove that the thermal component of the equilibrium is symmetric while the nuclear
component of the equilibrium is “symmetrisable”, i.e., it can be symmetrised. The interest of
showing this property lies in the notion of symmetrisability and its mathematical-economical
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implications. We will show through a simple example that despite the symmetry of nuclear
capacities, the nuclear component of the equilibrium is potentially asymmetric which leads
to asymmetric equilibriums of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem. Therefore,
considering the feature of symmetrisability, we can move from an asymmetric equilibrium to
a symmetric equilibrium by focusing on the symmetric nuclear component of the equilibrium.
From a mathematical point of view, this property permits to concentrate only on the symmetric
solution and thus, it may be used to decrease the number of the optimization variables of the
optimal inter-temporal production problem (3) which simplifies its numerical resolution. In
addition, it provides us with an appealing economical feature regarding the profit resulting
from a symmetrisable equilibrium.
4.2.1 Existence of an asymmetric equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal pro-
duction problem: An example
It should be noticed that the nuclear component of the equilibrium (qnuc1jt , q
nuc
2jt , · · · , q
nuc
Njt) is
potentially asymmetric. In order to understand this asymmetry, let us give an example in the
case of two producers (N = 2). Let (q̂nuc1jt , q̂
nuc
2jt ) be a symmetric equilibrium such that the price
is the same during the period 1 and the period 2 (i.e. p1 = p2). This occurs in particular, if
nuclear is the marginal technology in periods 1 and 2. Then, any feasible production realized
by the unit 3 of producer 1 (respectively 2) in periods 1, 2 means a solution of the following
system:


q131 + q231 = q̂131 + q̂231 = D1 - Q
hyd
Tot,1, supply - demand equilibrium constraint
in month 1
q132 + q232 = q̂132 + q̂232 = D2 - Q
hyd
Tot,2, supply - demand equilibrium constraint
in month 2
q131 + q132 = q̂131 + q̂132 = S
3
1 , nuclear fuel constraint for unit 3 of producer 1
q231 + q232 = q̂231 + q̂232 = S
3
1 , nuclear fuel constraint for unit 3 of producer 2
and remains unchanged during the remaining periods (qnucnjt = q̂
nuc
njt , for all n ∈ {1, 2}, for all
j 6= 3, and for t > 3) will be still an equilibrium. Consequently, there exists at least one
asymmetric equilibrium of the nuclear inter-temporal profit maximization problem of producer
n , where for example unit 3 produces more for producer 1 than for producer 2 in period 1 (and
the opposite in period 2 in order to compensate). This is related to the absence of unicity in
part (β) of Proposition 4.1.
4.2.2 The notion of symmetrisability
In view of the assumption that the nuclear and thermal capacities are symmetric among pro-
ducers, if (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t )
T
t=1, · · · , ((q
nuc
Njt)
J
j=1, q
th
Nt)
T
t=1) is an equilibrium of this problem, we show
that the thermal component of the equilibrium is symmetric while the nuclear component of
the equilibrium is symmetrisable.
We define a symmetrisable equilibrium as follows:
Definition 4.1 Let (q1, q2, · · · , qN) be an equilibrium. This equilibrium is called symmetrisable
if there exists a symmetric allocation (q˜1, q˜2, · · · , q˜N), which is an equilibrium and “leads” to
the same prices as the initial allocation (qn)
N
n=1.
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4.2.3 An economical property resulting from the notion of symmetrisability of an
equilibrium
The notion of symmetrisability of an equilibrium provides us with an interesting economical fea-
ture: the profit of a symmetrisable equilibrium (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN) is symmetric. This means that
the production levels of a symmetrisable equilibrium are equivalently profitable for all produc-
ers. This arises from the fact that the price induced by the symmetrisable equilibrium is equal
to the price induced by the symmetric equilibrium. Consequently, the profit (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN)
coming from a symmetrisable equilibrium is equal to the profit (p˜i1, p˜i2, · · · , p˜iN) resulting from
the deduced symmetric equilibrium. For a symmetric equilibrium, the value of profit is equal
among the different producers at the equilibrium state given that the price pt as well as the
production level are identical for all players and the production cost is symmetric for both
technologies.
4.2.4 Symmetry of the thermal component and symmetrisability of the nuclear
component of equilibrium
We proceed here with Proposition 4.2 which shows the symmetry of the thermal component
and the symmetrisability of the nuclear component of equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal
production problem.
Proposition 4.2 Let (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t )
T
t=1, · · · , ((q
nuc
Njt)
J
j=1, q
th
Nt)
T
t=1) be an equilibrium of the opti-
mal inter-temporal production problem (3). If the nuclear and thermal capacity are symmetric
among producers then the thermal component of the equilibrium is symmetric while the nuclear
component of the equilibrium is symmetrisable.
Proof
A proof of this proposition is provided in the Ph.D. thesis on pages 186−189 (Lykidi (2014)).
The proof is based on the separability17 of the optimal inter-temporal production problem
(3) with respect to the couple (qnucnjt , q
th
nt) and on the strict concavity of the thermal optimal
production problem producer n. On the other side, the nuclear optimal production problem of
producer n is not separable with respect to t, hence there is no symmetry of equilibrium.

In conclusion, through the property of “symmetrisability”, it is possible to derive a symmetric
equilibrium from an asymmetric equilibrium and thus to focus on the symmetric equilibrium
which shows the usefulness of this property for complex computational optimization problems
like ours.
4.3 Data
The data used in our numerical model comes from the French electricity market and it is
collected by different entities and for different years because of the difficulty of collection. In
particular, consumption data comes from the French Transmission & System Operator (named
RTE) for the year 2007, the annual generation capacity of hydro (run-of-river) is given by the
French nuclear operator (EDF) while the annual nuclear and thermal (coal and gas) generation
capacity is given by RTE for the year 2009, the nuclear fuel stock of reloading has been provided
by EDF for the same year. The fixed and variable costs of nuclear, coal and gas generation
come from the official report “Reference Costs of Electricity Production” issued by the ministry
17For the notion of separability cf. for example Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
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of industry (General Direction for Energy and Raw Materials (DGEMP) & Directorate for
Demand and Energy Markets (DIDEME)) and they are calculated for the year 2007. In view
of the specificities of the nuclear generation technology and of its production cost, we give a brief
analysis with respect to the impact of the discount rate on the calculation of the nuclear cost, the
economic consequences of a load-following mode of operation of nuclear reactors on the nuclear
cost as well as the principal points of differentiation between nuclear and thermal production
cost (Bertel and Naudet (2004)) in the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014). Then, we present explicitly
some specific data assumptions considered for our numerical modelling regarding: (i) the value
of the exchange rate, of the discount rate, of the cost of CO2 per ton and the price of coal and
gas (ii) the computation of the coefficients of the thermal production cost, (iii) the simulation
of the capacity for each type of nuclear unit and of the initial value of the nuclear fuel stock
(Sj1), (iv) the calculation of the number of days equivalent to full capacity, (v) the technical
minimum and maximum for an EPR reactor in order to determine the minimum and maximum
nuclear production constraints. Lastly, we mention a couple of economical results which can
be inferred within our data base and which are totally explicated in the second chapter: (i)
the average nuclear cost calculated here (37.25 euros per MWh) is close to the range of nuclear
electricity prices (37.5 - 38.8 euros per MWh) estimated for the NOME18 law (Commission for
Energy Regulation (CRE) estimated this range of prices in 2010 (before Fukushima accident
in 2011 (Les Echos (20/04/2011)) in order to propose to EDF a fair price for selling nuclear
capacity to alternative producers (Le Monde (01/02/2011))), (ii) the total monthly thermal
production cost is never covered except if other generation technologies with higher marginal
costs are called to meet demand (e.g. hydro-storage units).
4.4 Simulation results
In this section, we treat the problem of discontinuity of the merit order price which induces a
discontinuity (decrease) of the inter-temporal profit in order to resolve numerically the optimal
inter-temporal production problem within our data set. The proof of several mathematical
propositions presented here can be found in the Annex B of the Ph.D. thesis of Lykidi (2014).
4.4.1 “Regularization” of the optimal inter-temporal production problem
From both a theoretical and a numerical point of view, we “regularize” the merit order price in
order to deal with the problem of discontinuity and solve the optimal inter-temporal production
problem. To treat the problem of discontinuity numerically, we introduce an alternative model
in which the price is given by the thermal marginal cost (mcth(0) = bth) instead of (bnuc) during
periods when nuclear is the marginal technology. Hence, the price pt during the month t will
be
pt =
{
mcth(qtht ), if q
th
t > 0
mcth(0), if qtht = 0
=
{
bth + 2cthq
th
t , if q
th
t > 0
bth, if q
th
t = 0
(7)
Considering this “regularization” of the merit order price, the profit, being now a continuous
function, is maximized on the entire set of feasible solutions C within our numerical model. This
constitutes a continuous optimization problem called the “regularized” problem. Nevertheless,
18The “Nouvelle Organisation du Marche´ de l’Electricite´” (NOME) law indicates the findings of the report of
the Commission Champsaur which suggests access to nuclear electricity of the French nuclear operator (EDF)
for all producers (Champsaur (2009)). Specifically, the NOME law forces EDF to sell at a competitive price to
alternative producers of electricity and gas (GDF Suez, E.ON, ENEL, Poweo, Direct Energy, etc.) a quarter of
its nuclear production until 2025. This price should include the total cost of the operating nuclear plants.
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the “regularized” problem (continuous problem) is different from the economical problem (3)
described in subsection 2.5 (discontinuous problem) with regard to the objective function i.e.
the profit. More precisely, the profit considered in this problem is greater than the profit of the
economical problem since the value of bth (26.24 Euro/MWh) is greater than the value of bnuc
(5.01 Euro/MWh). However, we prove that the value of the “regularized” problem is the same
with the value of the economical problem which means that the value of profit at the optimum
is identical for both optimization problems (see Annex B, Proposition B.1). Hence, we deduce
that the “regularized” problem is a “good” approximation of our economical problem (Boyd
and Vandenberghe (2004)).
Theoretically, in Annex B, Proposition B.7 proves that a solution of the “regularized” prob-
lem which is not in the set F th implies the emptiness of the set of solutions of the economical
problem. From a numerical perspective, the solution of the “regularized” problem which is pre-
sented in this section is not in the set F th because the thermal production is not always used
to ensure the equality between supply and demand. This means that the set of solutions of the
economical problem is empty which shows the importance of emphasizing the numerical solution
resulting from the “regularized” problem. This numerical solution is only an “approximate”
solution of our economical problem.
It should be mentioned that the discontinuity of price observed at production vectors with
zero levels of thermal production poses an “economical problem”. More precisely, a producer,
who covers the monthly levels of demand during summer (low demand season) by running only
its nuclear units, is penalized since its nuclear production is evaluated at a low price (bnuc). This
price does not allow the amortization of the important fixed costs of nuclear. Hence, by realizing
an infinitesimal nuclear capacity withholding, thermal becomes the marginal technology leading
prices to a higher level (almost equal to bth) and valorizing nuclear production which justifies
our “regularization” of the merit order price.
4.4.2 General results
According to the economic analysis of Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 on page 12, the ther-
mal production is adjusted on the seasonal variations of demand, while the nuclear production
remains constant during the entire time horizon of the model. However, in view of our data, a
constant nuclear production is not a feasible solution in the case of a large nuclear set because
the deduced thermal production violates both minimum and maximum19 thermal production
constraints during some months (see Figure 2). In particular, the thermal production does not
meet demand during high demand months (winter). As one can see in figure20 1 and in figure
3, the amplitude of demand exceeds the maximum level of thermal production Qthmax. Conse-
quently, given that the nuclear production is constant, the thermal production can not balance
supply and demand each month. For this reason, the nuclear production has to be flexible and
follow the variations of demand. In conclusion, Proposition 3.3 says that the inter-temporal
profit maximization problem has no solutions on F within our numerical model.
19The maximum thermal production during a month is represented by the white blue dotted line and corre-
sponds to the nominal thermal capacity (including coal, gas, fuel, etc.) of the French set.
20The amounts of monthly demand Dt are obtained for the period January 2007 - December 2009. In
particular, the values of monthly demand during the period January 2007 - December 2007 come from our
historical data. Then, we reproduce these values by applying a positive rate of 1% per year on the monthly
demand for the years that follow (2008 and 2009) to take into account the increasing trend of demand from one
year to another. We did a rescaling on this data to take into account the diversity on the length of the months.
Note also that the monthly demand in 2007 results from the aggregation of the hourly demand found within
our historical data.
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Figure 1: Simulated demand (in MW)
We also observe (both graphically and with a numerical test) that the thermal and nuclear
production increase (and respectively decrease) simultaneously during almost the entire time
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Figure 2: Simulated thermal production resulting from a constant nuclear production (in MW)
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Figure 3: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW)
horizon of our model, which corresponds to the notion of “comonotonicity”21 introduced by
Yaari (1987) (see Figure 3). We also deduce, following a theoretical reasoning, that the nuclear
production being comonotonic to the thermal production and obviously to itself is comonotonic
to the total supply (the sum of nuclear and of thermal production). Consequently, if we take
into account the equality between supply and demand, we deduce that the nuclear production
is comonotonic to the demand. From a theoretical point of view, this result is not trivial and
it is particular appealing: (i) demand is dynamic but is not periodic22 because we assumed an
augmentation of the demand by a rate of 1% per year (see Footnote 20 on page 17), (ii) there is
a third variable which interferes between the demand and the nuclear production: the available
nuclear capacity during the month t, (
∑J
j=1 Q
j,nuc
max (t)) considering that some unit is inactive
during this month (month of reloading). Its evolution over time is periodic as it also appears in
figure23 4. From (i) and (ii) results that despite the fact that the available nuclear capacity is
periodic and thus, it repeats its values every year while the demand has an increasing tendency
from one year to another, the nuclear production follows constantly the variations of demand
i.e. they decrease and increase simultaneously. This shows why the comonotonicity between
21The vector (Xt)
T
t=1
, by definition, is comonotonic to the vector (Yt)
T
t=1
if (Xt′ −Xt)(Yt′ − Yt) > 0 holds for
all t, t′. It forbids the opposite evolution between two dates for X and Y which means mathematically that it
does not exist (t, t′) such that Xt′ > Xt and Yt′ < Yt.
22In mathematics, a periodic function is a function that repeats its values in regular intervals or periods.
The most important examples are the trigonometric functions, which repeat over intervals of length 2pi radians.
Periodic functions are used throughout science to describe oscillations, waves and other phenomena that exhibits
periodicity.
23The maximum nuclear production during the month t given that some unit is inactive during this month
(month of reloading) is represented by the purple dotted line. This quantity is obviously below the nominal
capacity of the French nuclear set represented by the crossed purple line. The minimum nuclear production
during the month t given that some unit is inactive during this month (month of reloading) is represented by
the purple line of asterisks.
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the demand and the nuclear production is a non-obvious result of particular interest.
4.4.3 Analytical results
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Figure 4: Simulated nuclear production (in MW)
In figure 4, we can see that the nuclear production follows the seasonal variations of demand
(high production during winter − low production during summer) but it never reaches its max-
imum value24 over the entire period T. The essentially periodic evolution of nuclear production
leads to a periodic evolution for the nuclear fuel stock which oscillates around the “stock of
reference”25. It increases during low demand seasons, exceeding the “stock of reference”, while
it decreases during high demand seasons falling below the “stock of reference” (see Figure 4,
Figure 6).
From a theoretical thinking using the notion of comonotonicity like we did in the case
of nuclear, the thermal production is comonotonic to the nuclear production which is itself
comonotonic to the demand. Thus, we conclude that the thermal production is essentially
comonotonic to the demand. In particular, it is increasing during winter (beginning from
October) until it reaches its peak value in December. Afterwards, it decreases progressively
until it takes its lowest value during summer.
The “regularized” price26 is high during winter by taking its highest value in December
and relatively low during summer (see Figure 7). From a theoretical point of view, this is
explained by the fact that the “regularized” price is comonotonic to the thermal production
since the price is determined by the thermal marginal cost, which is an increasing function of
24cf. Footnote 23.
25 The “stock of reference” is represented by the blue dotted line which shows the value of stock at the
beginning, being also the value of stock at the end.
26The red dotted line indicates the level of the “regularized” price when nuclear is the marginal technology.
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Figure 5: Simulated thermal production (in MW)
the thermal production. Additionally to this, in the previous paragraph, we showed that the
thermal production is comonotonic to the demand. Hence, the price is essentially comonotonic
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Figure 6: Simulated nuclear fuel stock (in MW)
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Figure 7: Simulated “regularized” price (in Euro/MWh)/Simulated “regularized” profit (omit-
ting profit coming from hydro (run-of-river) generation) (in Euro (million))
to the demand and, therefore, it follows closely demand’s seasonal variations.
The inter-temporal profit, being comonotonic to the price within our numerical model, is
basically comonotonic to the demand which leads to high profits during winter and at the
beginning of spring while lower profits are realized during summer and at the end of spring
(see Figure 7). We may also observe that its value can break-up in a cyclical component and
a linear trend which is slightly increasing. The reader should not pay attention to the exact
value of profit as it is conditional on the too many approximations we made (e.g. discount rate,
no mark-up rate, absence of profits coming from the hydro technology (run-of-river), etc.).
In view of the remark 3.2, the solution is unique with respect to the thermal component but
bearing in mind the other variables which do not have an impact on the inter-temporal profit
the entire solution is not necessarily unique.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.58
23
Finally, we observe that a variation of the length of the time horizon T of the model does
not lead to different behaviour patterns. The basically periodic evolution of the nuclear and
thermal production is the same during the entire time horizon of the model (e.g. for T = 72,
see Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW) (T=72)
4.4.4 The time period of marginality of nuclear and thermal generation technology
Simulation results show that the thermal production is marginal during months of high demand
while the nuclear production is marginal during months of low demand meaning half part of
the time (18 months over T = 36 months). In particular, nuclear stays marginal during almost
the entire period of spring and summer (April - September), while thermal is marginal during
autumn and winter (October - March) (see Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5). Hence, we see that
a producer maximizes its inter-temporal profit by running only its nuclear units when the
demand is low. The high duration of marginality of nuclear is first met in the theoretical
optimal solutions in the particular case that the production constraints are not saturated. In
view of our data, a constant nuclear production determines the price in the market during
months of low demand and the length of its period of marginality is almost the same with that
observed numerically. The time period of marginality of nuclear can be also explained by the
fact that the price is “regularized” and consequently, the nuclear production is evaluated in a
higher price than its own marginal cost (bnuc) in our numerical model.
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4.5 Optimal inter-temporal production problem VS Optimal short-
term production problem
In the case of the optimal short-term management of the nuclear fuel reservoir, the optimization
of production (nuclear, thermal) is realized over a management horizon equal to a month. In
this paper, we carried on with the inter-temporal optimization based on the direct optimization
of production over the entire time horizon T of the model (36 months). Each optimization
problem has been treated within a simple numerical model in which the price is “regularized”
(i.e. is determined by the thermal marginal cost when nuclear is the marginal technology).
The symmetric approach regarding the “regularization” of these optimization problems makes
pertinent their comparison.
The optimal short-term production problem provides us with a solution that can be seen
as a “local” optimum, since it is optimal within a subset of feasible points. By contrast, the
optimal inter-temporal production problem determines a global optimum which is the optimal
solution among all the possible solutions. Consequently, from a theoretical point of view, the
optimal inter-temporal profit has to be greater than the optimal short-term profit and it is
what we also deduce from our numerical results. However, the variation of the profit when we
move from a full optimization of production to a per month optimization (and vice versa) is of
the order of 5% and is due to the slight variation of the variable cost of production since the
initial losses (fixed costs) are identical for both problems (see Table 2, Table 3). Furthermore,
the profit’s value can be decomposed in a cyclical component and a linear trend that increases
progressively from one year to another in both optimization problems.
Optimal inter-temporal Optimal short-term
production problem production problem
Total “regularized”
profit (in Euro) −9.147× 109 −9.636× 109
Total “regularized”
nuclear profit (in Euro) −5.957× 109 −6.332× 109
Total “regularized”
thermal profit (in Euro) −3.189× 109 −3.304× 109
Table 2
Optimal inter-temporal Optimal short-term
production problem production problem
Total cost
(in Euro) 5.261× 1010 5.250× 1010
Total
variable cost
(in Euro) 1.075× 1010 1.064× 1010
Total
fixed cost
(in Euro) 4.186× 1010 4.186× 1010
Table 3
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Figure 9: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW) resulting from
the optimal short-term production problem
An important point of differentiation between the optimal inter-temporal production prob-
lem and the optimal short-term production problem consists of the length of the period of
marginality of nuclear. In both numerical models, nuclear production is paid at price bth which
is significantly higher than its marginal cost bnuc. This means that no penalty is caused by the
exclusive use of nuclear production. However, we observe in figure 9 on page 25 that thermal is
marginal during the majority of the months of period T in the case of the short-term optimiza-
tion of production (the only exception is the last sub-period when nuclear units “overproduce”).
The producer allocates an important amount of nuclear fuel stock during periods of high de-
mand and thus the stock remaining in the reservoir is not sufficient to equilibrate supply and
demand throughout low demand periods. In the optimal inter-temporal production problem,
thermal is marginal only during months of high demand since the nuclear production is suffi-
cient to cover the entire demand during periods of low demand (see Figure 3 on page 19). So,
we deduce that when the producer maximizes its instantaneous profit, the price (respectively
the profit) increases during low demand seasons. On the contrary, when the producer looks
at the maximization of its inter-temporal profit, the price (respectively the profit) decreases
during periods of low demand. As a conclusion, when the producer does not know how to reach
an equilibrium of the optimal production problem and thus, it searches to determine a possible
optimal production path on a short-term (monthly) basis, we obtain only a signal regarding the
duration of nuclear’s marginality. This signal does not reveal what happens when the producer
having determined an equilibrium proceeds with the inter-temporal optimization of production
which is a limit of the optimal short-term production problem.
A common point between the optimal short-term production problem and the optimal inter-
temporal production problem concerns their solutions. More precisely, we get unicity of so-
lutions with respect to the thermal component in both the optimal short-term production
problem and the optimal inter-temporal production problem. We can also see that, in both
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optimal production problems, a prolongation of the time horizon of the model T does not result
in different production behaviours (see Figure 8 on page 23 and Figure 10 on page 26).
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Figure 10: Simulated hydro(run-of-river)/nuclear/thermal production (in MW) resulting from
the optimal short-term production problem (T=72)
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the optimal inter-temporal management of the nuclear fuel reservoir
of flexible nuclear plants in a competitive regime under production and storage constraints as
well as constraints imposed by the equality between supply and demand each month. We
focused on a medium-term horizon to take into account the seasonal variation of the demand
between winter (high demand) and summer (low demand). The theoretical and numerical
results obtained here are inherent in the assumptions made within our model.
First, we showed that, under some assumptions that hold within our model and for our data,
the discontinuity (decrease) of price when nuclear becomes the marginal technology induces a
discontinuity (decrease) of the inter-temporal profit of a producer. The dynamic nature of the
nuclear fuel stock due to its modelling as a reservoir of energy make obvious the discontinuity of
price which is the reason why it is difficult to find an equilibrium from a theoretical and numer-
ical point of view. Mathematically, we simplified our optimal production problem by looking
at a property of the “interior” solutions of the optimal inter-temporal production problem i.e.
solutions that do not saturate the minimum and maximum production constraints. Econom-
ically, from a theoretical point of view, we proved that these solutions are fully characterized
by a constant nuclear production given that the thermal capacity is sufficient in order to follow
entirely the variations of demand which implies a baseload operation for nuclear plants.
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From a numerical perspective, we “regularized” the price in order to deal with the problem of
discontinuity of price. Then, the “regularized” price consisted of the sum of the nuclear marginal
cost and an “opportunity” cost of using only nuclear capacities to meet demand instead of
thermal capacities which results in a higher electricity price for consumers when nuclear is the
marginal technology and in a higher market price for nuclear producers that helps to amortize
their important fixed costs. This valorization of the nuclear production is met in the monitoring
report of the French energy regulator (CRE) in 2007 (Regulatory Commission of Energy (2007)).
Besides the economical consequences of the “regularization” of the price mentioned above, it also
led to a satisfying situation which permitted to attain an equilibrium. The “regularization”
of an economic phenomenon in order to reach an intellectually satisfying situation can be
found for example in Balasko’s work regarding the theory of general equilibrium (Balasko
(1988)). The price “regularization” led to an alternative continuous problem (the “regularized
problem”) which has the same value with the economical problem (discontinuous problem) and
permitted to obtain a “good” approximation of our economical problem. Proving that the set
of solutions of the economical problem is empty, we showed the interest of focusing on the
numerical solution resulting from the “regularized” problem which is only an approximative
solution of our economical problem.
From a numerical perspective, we observed that solutions that are fully characterized by a
constant nuclear production do not exist within our numerical model since the thermal capacity
being inferior than demand’s amplitude is not sufficient to cover the demand every month. This
showed that, in France, where nuclear power is the principal electricity generation technology,
nuclear can not be managed uniquely as a baseload generation technology at the optimum.
It has also to operate at semi-base load following a part of the variable demand. Indeed,
simulations showed that the nuclear production also adjusts to demand’s seasonal variations to
ensure the supply-demand equilibrium.
Theoretically and numerically, we found that in a decentralized market, producers optimum
is obtained by making important investments in thermal capacity so that supply meets con-
sumers needs for electricity (French case). Therefore, we conclude that the level of investments
in order to build new capacities of a generation technology (e.g. nuclear) plays a major role
in the determination of the production behaviour at equilibrium not only of the corresponding
technology but also of the other generation technologies (e.g. thermal) that participate in the
energy mix of a country.
The duration of marginality of nuclear is significant since the nuclear production covers the
total monthly demand through the half of the time horizon T (18 months) and particularly
during summer when the demand is low. A producer has to take into account the thermal
generation capacity only during high demand periods to meet demand. The high duration
of marginality of nuclear can be explained by: (i) the fact that an important time period of
marginality of nuclear is originally observed in the theoretical solutions of the optimal inter-
temporal production problem given our data, (ii) the “regularization” of the price which do
not penalize the nuclear production within our numerical example.
Numerically, the results of the optimal inter-temporal production problem were contrasted
with the results of the optimal short-term production problem. The producer uses practically
all the time the thermal production to maximize its current monthly profit driving this way
prices (respectively profits) in relatively high levels even during low demand seasons. This
is not the case when producers maximize their inter-temporal profits since we noticed that,
structurally, phenomena of marginality of nuclear may occur. More precisely, within our data
set, the price in the market is determined by nuclear during periods of low demand from a
theoretical and numerical perspective. Hence, despite the fact that the exclusive use of nuclear
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production is no more penalized in both problems, the length of the period of marginality of
nuclear is more important in the optimal inter-temporal production problem than in the optimal
short-term production problem where producers are short-sighted with respect to future gains.
Nevertheless, the total profit resulting from the optimal inter-temporal production problem
is higher than the total profit coming from the optimal short-term production problem since
the solution of the first optimization problem constitutes a global optimum while the second
problem gives a solution that can be thought as a “local” optimum.
In the real French electricity market, no behaviour coming from the resolution of the optimal
inter-temporal production problem is fully observed. For example, as stated in the report
of CRE in 2007, nuclear has been the marginal technology during periods of low demand.
Nevertheless, the duration of marginality of nuclear indicated by the report was less important
(a total of 1 or 2 months per year) than than the one resulted from the optimal inter-temporal
production behaviour (the half part of the year) (Regulatory Commission of Energy (2007)).
Furthermore, the nuclear units do not always produce at a constant rate as we deduced at the
optimum from a theoretical point of view. These deviations from reality could be justified by
the fact that the French nuclear operator (EDF) does not consider our assumptions that limit
our model to a certain extent but help to overcome difficulties so that an equilibrium is found.
Economically, the theoretical and numerical results obtained in our model may interest the
system operator and provide insights for policy in the energy sector.
To conclude, in all cases, nuclear fuel modelled as a “reservoir” of energy follows the seasonal
variations of demand in a competitive electricity market where nuclear capacity exceeds ther-
mal capacity to a significant degree. But even if nuclear power does not possess the greatest
part of the energy mix of a country (like France), it can be still operated at semi-base load
following a part of demand’s variations because, technically, modern nuclear reactors are capa-
ble of flexible operation. This could lead to a more significant use of nuclear in the electricity
production of a country and therefore a higher share of nuclear power as a percentage of its
national energy production especially since nuclear promotes: (i) reduction of CO2 emissions,
(ii) energy independence from fossil fuel generation technologies, (iii) large-scale deployment
of intermittent electricity sources (renewable energy), (iv) economic competitiveness of a coun-
try’s energy sector. All these factors play a very important role in the future of nuclear energy
worldwide.
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